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Abstract
This paper analyzes the existence of an inﬂation tax Laﬀer curve
(ITLC) in the context of two standard optimizing monetary models:
a cash-in-advance model and a money in the utility function model.
Agents’ preferences are characterized in the two models by a constant
relative risk aversion utility function. Explosive hyperinﬂation rules
out the presence of an ITLC. In the context of a cash-in-advance econ-
omy, this paper shows that explosive hyperinﬂation is feasible and thus
an ITLC is ruled out whenever the relative risk aversion parameter is
greater than one. In the context of an optimizing model with money
in the utility function, this paper ﬁrstly shows that an ITLC is ruled
out. Moreover, it is shown that explosive hyperinﬂations are more
likely when the transactions role of money is more important. How-
ever, hyperinﬂationary paths are not feasible in this context unless
certain restrictions are imposed.
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11I N T R O D U C T I O N
Hyperinﬂation is usually viewed as the result of an inﬂationary ﬁnance policy.
The rationale for an inﬂationary ﬁnance policy is that generating inﬂation
through a persistent rise in the money supply can be understood as a means
of raising revenues for the government by using an inﬂation tax.1 Most of the
inﬂationary ﬁnance models developed in the literature (for instance, Evans
and Yarrow, 1981; Kiguel, 1989; Bruno, 1989; Bruno and Fischer 1990) are
built on Cagan’s demand for money (Cagan, 1956). Under perfect foresight
those models imply the possibility of dual equilibria and the existence of
a (concave) inﬂation tax Laﬀer curve (ITLC), which means that inﬂation
does not explode. Based on this traditional approach, a recurrent theme in
the large empirical literature on hyperinﬂation (Cagan, 1956; Sargent, 1977;
Taylor, 1991, Phylaktis and Taylor, 1993; Kiguel and Neumeyer, 1995; among
others) is the analysis of whether the economy is on the “eﬃcient” side of
the ITLC (that is, whether inﬂation tax is increasing with inﬂation during a
hyperinﬂationary episode).2
This traditional approach has recently been challenged because it fails
to explain many stylized facts observed during hyperinﬂation. For instance,
Buiter (1987), Dornbusch, Sturzenegger and Wolf (1990), Bernholz and Gers-
bach (1992) and Vázquez (1998) emphasize that hyperinﬂation is better char-
acterized by an unstable dynamic process where inﬂa t i o ns p e e d su pa n dr e a l
money balances tend to vanish.
This paper uses an analytical approach to analyze whether explosive hy-
perinﬂation is feasible and thus to study whether an ITLC is ruled out. We
consider two standard optimizing monetary models: a cash-in-advance model
and a money-in-the-utility-function model. The two models represent alter-
native ways of modeling the role of money as a medium of exchange. In both
models the representative agent’s preferences are represented by a constant
relative risk aversion utility function. Interestingly, one can show that the
money-in-the-utility-function model collapses in the cash-in-advance model
1It must be clear that an inﬂationary ﬁnance policy might not result in an optimal
inﬂation tax raised by a benevolent social planner. Then, why should a government and
monetary authorities adhere to a mechanical, presumably grossly ineﬃcient, inﬂationary
ﬁnance policy? There are, at least, two complementary reasons, which are well documented
in the inﬂationary ﬁnance literature. First, most hyperinﬂationary episodes are driven
mainly by huge government spending after some very destructive war. Second, printing
money is usually the easiest way to ﬁnance huge government expenditure when it is diﬃcult
to increase taxes due to the lack of political consensus and weak governments.
2The term ITLC refers to a concave (hump-shaped) function relating inﬂation tax
to inﬂation. Alternatively, we can also deﬁne the ITLC as a hump-shaped function that
relates inﬂation tax to real money balances.
2when money is strictly essential for purchasing goods. We argue that a cash-
in-advance model (or alternatively, a money-in-the-utility-function model
with money being essential) is a sensible approach to analyzing hyperin-
ﬂationary scenarios because extreme inﬂation dramatically decreases credit
transactions and in general the use of long-term contracts. This implies that
money becomes more essential for purchasing goods during hyperinﬂation
than during stable periods. There are two main well-known reasons to avoid
the use of long-term contracts during hyperinﬂation. First, the rapid de-
preciation of money during hyperinﬂation that induces agents to spend the
money as soon as they have got it (Casella and Feinstein, 1990, report anec-
dotal evidence on this issue). Second, the instability involving relative price
movements during hyperinﬂation (see Tang and Wang, 1993 for empirical
evidence on this issue) that induces a high uncertainty about the outcomes
of long-term contracts.
In the context of a cash-in-advance economy, we show that an ITLC arises
if and only if the relative risk aversion parameter is less than one. This means
that an ITLC is feasible whenever the relative risk aversion parameter lies
outside the usual range assumed, which implies an unrealistic high intertem-
poral substitution for consumption.3 Moreover, explosive hyperinﬂation can
only arise in this framework if the relative risk aversion parameter is greater
than one. In the context of an optimizing model with money-in-the-utility-
function, this paper shows that explosive hyperinﬂation is more likely when
the transactions role of money becomes more important. Moreover, we show
that an ITLC is also ruled out in a money in the utility framework unless
other restrictions are imposed, for instance that the utility function would
be additive separable in consumption and real money balances and that the
utility function assumed for real money balances satisﬁes certain restrictions.
The main contribution of this paper is to provide a characterization of
agent’s preferences that are compatible with an ITLC and thus with stable
hyperinﬂation or, alternatively, with explosive hyperinﬂation. Our character-
ization shows that stable hyperinﬂation is only feasible if agents’ preferences
are described by an unrealistic relative risk aversion parameter. However,
explosive hyperinﬂation is feasible if the relative risk aversion parameter lies
inside the usual range, that is, if preferences have curvature higher than the
logarithmic utility function. This characterization may help to assess the
welfare costs associated with a stabilization policy carried out during hyper-
inﬂation since the type of preferences assumed must be consistent with the
way the researcher views hyperinﬂation (as a stable process or, alternatively,
3Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ (1987) consider that reasonable values for the relative risk
aversion parameter lie in the range 2 to 10.
3as an explosive dynamic process).
The optimizing monetary models considered in this paper are character-
ized by a unique unstable steady state. A skeptical reader may argue that
any model of hyperinﬂa t i o nm u s tb ea l s oa b l et oe x p l a i nt h ec a s eo fl o ws t a -
ble inﬂation. As in Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1983),4 we do not share the view
that a model of hyperinﬂation must explain necessarily the case of low in-
ﬂation since a model of hyperinﬂation can be extremely stylized reﬂecting,
for instance, that to a great extent the classical dichotomy between real and
nominal variables holds in a hyperinﬂationary scenario. Moreover, money
demand is usually assumed to depend only on expected inﬂa t i o ni no r d e r
to analyze hyperinﬂationary episodes, and then it does not depend on real
income as occurs in low inﬂation periods. From our point of view, it is clear
that in order to characterize low inﬂation dynamics one needs to specify a
more complex money demand than the one assumed in hyperinﬂationary
models. But for the same reason, it is hard to believe that a simple func-
tion characterizing money demand during hyperinﬂationary periods would be
appropriate to characterize the dynamics of low and stable inﬂation. More
generally, hyperinﬂation distort in many ways economies. Some examples are
the following. First, money becomes essential for agents engaging in trans-
actions. Thus, as pointed out by Casella and Feinstein (1990), economic ex-
change patterns during hyperinﬂation are dramatically diﬀerent from those
observed in low inﬂation periods. Second, nominal anchors such as price and
wages indexation tend to disappear during hyperinﬂation aﬀecting inﬂation-
ary dynamics. Third, expectational dynamics can change substantially in the
transition from a low inﬂation scenario to a high inﬂation scenario. Thus,
adaptive learning can be appropriate to modeling expectations when inﬂa-
tion is low. However, when inﬂation reaches high levels agents most likely
respond rapidly to changes in inﬂation, and instantaneously during hyper-
inﬂation since systematic forecast mistakes on inﬂation result in prohibitive
costs. The analysis of expectational dynamics has been already followed in
a recent paper by Nicolini and Marcet (2002) aiming to explain recurrent
hyperinﬂations.
We believe that introducing some of these features in a model would
be useful to characterize dynamics from a low inﬂation steady state to a
high inﬂation steady state. However, the aim of this paper is diﬀerent and
rather modest. We try to characterize explosive hyperinﬂation where an
economy is just in a high inﬂation scenario, where there is perfect foresight,
4Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1983) characterize explosive hyperinﬂa t i o ni nt h ec o n t e x to fa
money-in-the-utility function model where the utility function is additive separable in
consumption and real money balances. In their model, there is a unique unstable steady
state as in the models studied in this paper.
4money demand depends only on inﬂation and money is essential. The point
raised in this paper is that hyperinﬂationary dynamics derived from standard
maximizing models are consistent with a characterization of hyperinﬂation
as an explosive process. However, these models are not consistent with a
characterization of the economy being in the ineﬃcient side of the inﬂation
tax Laﬀer curve as suggested in traditional inﬂationary ﬁnance models.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 characterizes the
existence of an ITLC (that implies the existence of an inﬂation tax maximiza-
tion rule) in terms of a money demand restriction. Moreover, this section
reviews the approach followed in the empirical literature in order to analyze
whether the economy is on the “eﬃcient” side of the ITLC where ITLC is
increasing (decreasing) with inﬂation (real money balances). Section 3 stud-
ies a cash-in-advance economy. Section 4 studies an optimizing model with
money-in-the-utility-function. Section 5 concludes.
2 INFLATION TAX LAFFER CURVE
Inﬂationary ﬁnance models usually assume that a constant per-capita share of




where M(t) is per-capita nominal money supply at time t and P(t) is the
price level. As usual a dot on a variable denotes its time derivative.
Using the latter expression, denoting per-capita real money balances by
m(t) and omitting the time index for the sake of simplicity, we can write the
law of motion for real money balances as follows
˙ m = d − m π, (1)
where π is the rate of inﬂation (that is, ˙ P/P). The inﬂation tax, Ti,i s
deﬁned as the loss of purchasing power of a given amount of nominal money
balances due to the existence of a positive inﬂation rate. Formally,
T
i = m π. (2)
According to (1) real money balances decrease whenever inﬂation tax is
greater than d (that is, the share of government’s deﬁcit that is ﬁnanced
by issuing high-powered money). Since d is a constant, we can conclude
f r o m( 1 )a n d( 2 )t h a tTi is strongly concave (convex) if and only if ˙ m is a
strongly convex (concave) function of real money balances.
5The traditional approach builds upon Cagan’s demand for money
ln(m)=κ − µπ, (3)
where κ is a positive constant and µ is the (positive and constant) semi-
elasticity of money demand with respect to the nominal interest rate. Based
on (3), Figures 1 and 2 summarize the two well known key aspects of the
traditional view on hyperinﬂationary dynamics. First, dual steady states
may co-exist for a given level of government deﬁcit d whenever this level is
not too high and κ,µare determined accordingly. Second, the existence of
a high-inﬂation trap since the high-inﬂation steady state, m1, is stable and
the low-inﬂation steady state, m2, is unstable. Notice that the high-inﬂation
steady state, m1, is on the “wrong” side of the ITLC, that is, an increase
in real money balances raises inﬂation tax (or alternatively, a decrease in
inﬂation raises inﬂation tax).
A hump-shaped ITLC is characterized by the existence of a level of real
money balances for which the ITLC is maximized. Let us assume that the
demand for money is a general decreasing function of the inﬂation rate, the
inverse of money demand function exists, and the money market instan-
taneously clears. The inverse of money demand function, f,i sg i v e nb y
π = f(m) with f0(.) < 0. The following proposition relates the inﬂation tax
maximization rule to the demand for money.
Proposition 1: Assume that an ITLC exists (that is, Ti is strongly
concave). The inﬂation tax is maximized when the amount of real money
balances is such that the elasticity of the inverse of the demand for money
function ηf is one.
Proof: The inﬂation tax is given by mf(m).T h e ﬁrst-order condition for






where m∗ denotes the level of real money balances which maximizes the
inﬂation tax. Denoting the elasticity of the inverse of money demand function
with respect to real money balances by ηf,t h ef o r m e rﬁrst-order condition














6establishes the condition for a maximum (that is, the condition characterizing
a strongly concave ITLC). The proof is completed.¥
Notice that equation (4), in general, characterizes the inﬂation tax max-
imization rule because, as we shall show below, an inverse money demand
function, such as f(.), typically arises from an agent’s optimization problem.
Even if f(.) include more arguments than m (for instance, the real interest
rate and the level of income), condition (4) still characterizes the inﬂation
tax maximization policy with f0(.) being replaced by fm(.) (i.e., the partial
derivative of f with respect to m).
The empirical literature on hyperinﬂation analyzes whether huge inﬂa-
tion rates are consistent with the policy to maximize the inﬂation tax by
monetary authorities. Notice that an inﬂation tax maximization rule only
makes sense when the inﬂation tax function, Ti, has a maximum. By us-
i n gP r o p o s i t i o n1( e q u a t i o n(4)), we can easily show the well-known result
that when the demand for money is characterized by Cagan’s demand for
money (3),t h er a t eo fi n ﬂation that maximizes the inﬂation tax is given by
the inverse of the semi-elasticity of demand for money with respect to the
nominal interest rate, 1/µ. Thus, the empirical literature on hyperinﬂation
built on Cagan’s demand for money usually tests whether inﬂation dynamics
are consistent with an inﬂation tax maximization rule by, ﬁrst, averaging
t h er a t eo fi n ﬂation over the sample period and, then, by testing whether
or not averaging inﬂation is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 1/ˆ µ,w h e r eˆ µ is the
estimated value of µ.
We think that this way of proceeding has two caveats. First, it relies on
an ad-hoc form of characterizing money demand. Second, since the inﬂation
process seems to be nonstationary during hyperinﬂation, averaging the rate
of inﬂation over the sample period might not be appropriate. The ﬁrst caveat
(arguably) seems to be a mild one since, on the one hand, Cagan’s money
demand ﬁts data reasonably well in most hyperinﬂationary episodes studied
in the literature. On the other hand, as shown by Calvo and Leiderman
(1992), Cagan’s demand for money can be derived from ﬁrst principles by
assuming that money enters directly in the utility function and by consider-
ing a particular functional form of the utility function for money. We think,
h o w e v e r ,t h a tt h es e c o n dc a v e a ti sm o r es e r i o u sb e c a u s ei n ﬂation is always
rising during hyperinﬂationary periods. The rise in inﬂation could be due,
ﬁrstly, to the fact that inﬂation really follows an explosive (nonstationary)
process or, alternatively, to the fact that the inﬂation rate is along the con-
vergence path leading to a steady state rate of inﬂation. In either case, the
consideration of the averaging rates of inﬂation over the sample period is,
at least, problematic because, in the former case, the average is speciﬁct o
7the sample period (that is, the ﬁr s tm o m e n to ft h ei n ﬂation process does
not exist). In the later case, averaging the rates of inﬂation over the sample
period does not approximate well the steady state of the inﬂation rate.
Due to these limitations of the empirical evidence found following the
traditional approach, we henceforth follow an analytical strategy by studying
in the context of two optimizing monetary models whether the huge rates
of inﬂation observed during hyperinﬂationary episodes are consistent with
an ITLC, which implies a stable dynamic process for real money balances
and inﬂa t i o na sd e s c r i b e db yt h eh i g h - i n ﬂation steady state represented in
Figures 1 and 2 or, alternatively, those huge rates of inﬂation are the result
of an unstable dynamic process that leads to explosive hyperinﬂation.
3 A CASH-IN-ADVANCE ECONOMY
The two optimizing monetary models considered in this paper assume a con-
tinuous time model where the economy consists of a large number of identical
inﬁnitely-lived households. There is no uncertainty. Each household has a
non-produced endowment y(t) > 0 of the non-storable consumption good per
unit of time. In the cash-in-advance model, the representative household’s




where c(t) is per-capita consumption, U(.) is the increasing and concave
utility function and 0 <r<1 denotes the constant subjective discount
rate which, following Calvo (1987), is assumed to be equal to the real rate
of interest. As shown below, this assumption implies that the demand for
money function is time-invariant as the demand for money function assumed
in the traditional inﬂationary ﬁnance literature.5 The utility function is





where 0 < α < ∞ denotes the constant relative risk aversion parameter that
measures the curvature of the utility function.
5Moreover, empirical papers on hyperinﬂation aim at uncover a stable (time-invariant)
demand for real money balances in such unstable scenarios. By working with a time-
invariant demand for real money balances, we aim to convince the reader that our results
are not driven by an unstable demand for real money balances.
6We focus our attention on this class of utility functions because they play a central
role in modern intertemporal macroeconomics.
8We deﬁne ﬁnancial wealth and nominal interest rate as
w(t)=m(t)+b(t),
i(t)=r + π(t),
respectively, where b(t) denotes real per capita government debt. The house-
hold’s budget constraint is
˙ w = rw(t)+y(t) − τ(t) − [c(t)+i(t)m(t)], (7)
where τ is a lump-sum tax (government transfer if negative) and the term
in brackets denotes full consumption, that is, the sum of consumption and
costs of holding money.
In addition, as in the cash-in-advance literature, we assume that money
is strictly essential to buy the consumption good. In particular, in order to
consume c units of the consumption good at time t, the household must hold
a stock of real money balances, m, greater or equal than c. Formally,
m(t) ≥ c(t). (8)
At time 0 the household chooses the paths of c and m in order to maximize
(5) subject to (7) and (8). Assuming the existence of an interior solution for c,
and that money is return-dominated by the bond (that is, i(t)=r + π(t) >
0, and this implies that (8) holds with equality), the following ﬁrst-order
condition is obtained from the household’s optimization problem:
[m(t)]
−α = λ[1 + i(t)], (9)
where λ is the associated Lagrange multiplier, which is time-invariant since
the instantaneous rate of discount is assumed to be equal to the real rate of
interest. Then, equation (9) characterizes the time-invariant demand for real




By using the deﬁnition of the nominal interest rate, and after some small





where k = λ(1 + r) is a constant. Notice that equation (11) is truly the
inverse of a demand for money function, thus relating the rate of inﬂation
9to real money balances. The following proposition characterizes the rate of
inﬂation and real money balances, which are consistent with the inﬂation tax
m a x i m i z a t i o nr u l ea n dt h u sw i t ha nI T L C ,a saf u n c t i o no ft h er e l a t i v er i s k
aversion parameter, α,a n dt h er a t eo fd i s c o u n t ,r.
Proposition 2: Assume a cash-in-advance economy and that the utility
function is characterized by a constant relative risk aversion parameter, α.
There is a (strongly concave) ITLC if and only if α < 1. Moreover, the rate






Proof: The ﬁrst part of the proposition is proven by showing that Ti is a






which implies that there is an ITLC (that is,
∂2[Ti]
∂m2 < 0) if and only if α < 1.
By using equation (11),t h ei n ﬂation tax maximization condition, equa-



















Thus, the proof is completed.¥
Proposition 2 establishes that huge inﬂation rates under the inﬂation tax
maximization rule occur when α is smaller than (but close to) one. Further-
more, when α is equal to one (that is, the utility function is logarithmic),
t h e r ei sn o( ﬁnite) inﬂation rate maximizing the inﬂation tax.
As shown in Section 1, a strongly convex ˙ m (or alternatively, a strongly
concave Ti) is consistent with the traditional view of describing hyperinﬂation
as a stable dynamic process. Therefore, Proposition 2 shows that in the
10context of a cash-in-advance economy the condition α < 1 is a necessary
and suﬃcient condition to characterize hyperinﬂation as a stable dynamic
process.
We now turn on to describe hyperinﬂation as an unstable dynamic pro-
cess. In particular, the following proposition shows that if α > 1 hyperinﬂa-
tion can be characterized as an explosive dynamic process.
Proposition 3: Assume a cash-in-advance economy and that the utility
function is characterized by a constant relative risk aversion parameter, α.
The law of motion of real money balances is a strongly concave function (i.e.
∂2 ˙ m
∂m2 < 0)a n dlimm−→0 ˙ m = −∞ if and only if α > 1.
Proof: The ﬁr s tp a r to fP r o p o s i t i o n3i sad i rect corollary of Proposition
2s i n c eTi is strongly concave (convex) if and only if ˙ m is strongly convex
(concave). The second part is proven by taking into account (1) and then
showing that
lim







−∞ if α > 1,
d − λ
−1 if α =1 ,
do t h e r w i s e .
Thus, the proof is completed.¥
Figure 3 describes hyperinﬂation as an unstable dynamic process. Notice
that to the left of the steady state m∗, the economy will be moving along an
unstable hyperinﬂationary path where real money balances tend to vanish
and inﬂation explodes. Along these hyperinﬂationary paths the transversal-
ity condition (10) always holds since real money balances tend to vanish and
ﬁnancial wealth w(t) tends to be only determined by b(t), and it is reasonable
to assume that b(t) has an upper bound. Moreover, notice that the hyper-
inﬂationary paths generated by a cash-in-advance economy do not cross the
vertical axis. The rationale is that a cash-in-advance constraint means that
money is essential for purchasing and consuming goods. Therefore, if money
is essential the marginal utility of consumption goes to inﬁnity as real money
balances goes to zero since the Inada condition U0(0) = ∞ is satisﬁed by (6).
The fact that the marginal utility of consumption goes to inﬁnity implies
that inﬂation tax Ti goes to inﬁnite (and ˙ m goes to minus inﬁnity) whenever
α > 1 since inﬂation (that is an increasing function of the marginal utility
of consumption) in this case grows more rapidly than real money balances
decreases when the later goes to zero.
In sum, we have shown in this section that the huge rates of inﬂation
observed during hyperinﬂation are consistent with explosive inﬂa t i o ni na
11cash-in-advance economy if and only if the relative risk aversion parameter
is greater than one. However, an ITLC in a cash-in-advance economy is not
consistent with huge inﬂation rates unless an unrealistic high intertemporal
substitution for consumption (that is, α < 1) is assumed.
Next section shows that money-in-the-utility-function models neither gen-
erate feasible hyperinﬂationary paths nor an ITLC arises unless some partic-
ular restrictions are imposed.
4 MONEY-IN-THE-UTILITY- FUNCTION
The model considered in this section only diﬀers from the model studied in
the previous section in three aspects. First, we assume that the representative





Following Bental and Eckstein (1997) we assume a constant relative risk





where ω is a parameter measuring the transaction requirement of money.
Av a l u eo fω close to zero implies that money is not essential in buying
consumption. The higher ω is, the more important the transactions role of
money becomes. Second, it is assumed that there is a lower bound for real
money balances, b m ≥ 0. Formally,
m(t) ≥ b m, (16)
for all t. As discussed below, the restriction (16) guarantees the existence
of feasible hyperinﬂationary paths. Finally, there is no a cash-in-advance
constraint as (8).
This is an optimization problem with a bounded control. The solution
to this problem is obtained (see Kamien and Schwartz, 1991) by setting
the Lagrangian which is built by appending the constraint (16) to the cor-
responding Hamiltonian. Let us denote by b t the period where real money
balances reaches b m.T h eﬁrst-order conditions obtained from the household’s
optimization problem (that is, maximize (14) subject to (7) and (16)) imply
that for any t<b t the marginal rate of substitution between real money bal-
ances and consumption is equal to the nominal interest rate. Assuming that









Notice that, as in the cash-in-advance model, we also assume that the dis-
count rate is equal to the real rate of interest. Taking into account (17), the
law of motion for real money balances is




This expression shows that the law of motion for real money balances is a
linear and increasing function on m. Moreover, there is only a steady state
whenever d ≤
ωc(t)
(1−ω) for all t. This unique steady state is unstable. Notice
that the closer is ω to one (that is, the more important the transactions role
of money is) the more likely the existence of unstable hyperinﬂationary path
is. Figure 4 displays the real money balances dynamics in this framework.
Notice that to the left of the steady state m∗, the economy will be moving
along an unstable hyperinﬂationary path where real money balances go to b m
and inﬂation speeds up. Imposing a lower bound for real money balances, b m,
prevents that the ˙ m schedule will eventually cross the vertical axis at some
ﬁnite point, which implies negative real balances. This type of restriction is
relevant because some authors (for instance, Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ, 1983) have
argued that paths implying negative real money balances are infeasible in a
perfect foresight framework and therefore must be excluded from the class of
possible paths. However, one must notice that (16) is an ad-hoc restriction
and that the existence of a lower bound for real money balances is not easy
to motivate in the context of a money-in-the-utility-function model.7
>From the previous analysis one can draw the conclusion that feasible
hyperinﬂationary paths (those hyperinﬂationary paths satisfying ﬁrst-order
conditions and implying always non-negative real money balances) arise nat-
urally in the basic cash-in-advance model studied in Section 3. However,
7In the context of an optimizing monetary model with transaction costs, Vázquez (1998)
introduces a lower bound for consumption that, in the transaction cost monetary model
considered in his paper, also implies a lower bound for real money balances. Vázquez
(1998) interprets the lower bound for consumption as the threshold at which agents repu-
diate domestic money and decide to start engaging in barter trading, complete currency
substitution or home production for their own consumption.
13money-in-the-utility-function models have certain limitations to generate fea-
sible hyperinﬂationary paths. In particular, these limitations appear in the
money-in-the-utility-function model when real money balances and consump-
tion are substitutes. As shown by Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1983), if the utility
function is additive separable in consumption and real money balances, fea-
sible hyperinﬂationary paths cannot be ruled out unless other severe restric-
tions are imposed on individual preferences. This discussion points to the
conclusion that the basic cash-in-advance model is a natural framework to
analyze explosive hyperinﬂa t i o ns i n c et h e r ei sn on e e dt oi m p o s ea d d i t i o n a l
restrictions in this framework to generate feasible hyperinﬂationary paths.
It is interesting to notice that the money-in-the-utility-function model
collapses in the cash-in advance model in the extreme case that ω =1(that
is, money is strictly essential) since equation (15) then becomes (6) with the
cash-in-advance constraint (8) already substituted into the utility function
(6). Therefore, the cash-in-advance model can be viewed as the limiting case
of a money-in-the-utility-function model when money is considered strictly
essential (that is, when ω =1 ). As argued in the Introduction, a cash-
in-advance model (or, alternatively, a money-in-the-utility-function model
assuming that money is strictly essential) is a sensible approach to study
hyperinﬂation since huge inﬂation rates causes that credit transactions vanish
and money becomes strictly essential for purchasing goods.
Finally, we consider the case where the utility function is additive sepa-
rable in consumption and real money balances
U[c(t),m(t)] = U[c(t)] + V [m(t)], (18)
where U(.) and V (.) are increasing and concave functions. Both utility func-
tions are further assumed to be of the constant relative risk aversion class.
In this context, the ﬁrst-order condition obtained from the household’s op-
timization problem (that is, maximize (14) with U[c(t),m(t)] given by (18)
subject to (7)) establishes that the marginal utility of real money balances
is proportional to the nominal interest rate. Thus, the inverse of the money





After doing the same type of calculation carried out in the proof of Propo-
sition 2, we can show that there is an ITLC whenever the risk aversion
parameter characterizing V 0(m(t)) is lower than one. Alternatively, if we
specialize
V (m(t)) = m(t)[κ +1− ln(m(t))],
14as in Calvo and Leiderman (1992), we have that equation (19) becomes Ca-
gan money demand (3) and the associated ITLC is the one characterized in
Section 1.
5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Two competing approaches have been followed to characterize hyperinﬂation-
ary dynamics in the literature. The traditional approach posits the presence
of an ITLC where the huge rates of inﬂation observed during hyperinﬂa-
tionary episodes are viewed as the result of the economy being in a stable,
but “ineﬃcient”, high-inﬂation steady state. By contrast, another group
of researchers view hyperinﬂationary dynamics as the result of an unstable
dynamic process where real money balances vanish and inﬂation explodes.
This paper studies two prominent optimizing monetary models to char-
acterize hyperinﬂationary dynamics. In the context of a cash-in-advance
economy, we show that an ITLC is ruled out and explosive hyperinﬂation is
feasible whenever the relative risk aversion parameter is greater than one.
In an optimizing model with money-in-the-utility-function an ITLC is also
ruled out. Moreover, we show that explosive hyperinﬂationary dynamics are
more likely in this type of model when the transactions role of money becomes
more important. However, hyperinﬂationary paths are not feasible in this
model unless additional restrictions are considered. Therefore, the money-
in-the-utility-function model presents more limitations than the simple cash-
in-advance model to characterize hyperinﬂation as an explosive process.
Another important conclusion of this paper is that hyperinﬂationary dy-
namics derived from standard optimizing monetary models are consistent
with a characterization of hyperinﬂation as an explosive process. However,
they are not consistent with a characterization of the economy being in the
“ineﬃcient” side of the ITLC (where inﬂation may be huge, but stable) unless
some restrictive assumptions are imposed on agents’ preferences.
It seems that the empirical literature on hyperinﬂation has been focussed
on the traditional approach because the econometrics of explosive roots has
not been fully developed yet. We believe that pioneer papers on explosive
roots (for instance, Juselius and Mladenovic, 1999) together with theoretical
papers on the alternative view of hyperinﬂation suggest promising avenues
for future research on hyperinﬂationary dynamics.
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